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This paper aims to provide a unifying approach to the analysis
of understanding coherencies (interrogative understanding, e.g.
understanding why something is the case) and understanding
subject matters (objectual understanding) by highlighting the
contextualist nature of understanding. Inspired by the relevant
alternatives contextualism about knowledge, I will argue that
understanding (in the above mentioned sense) inherently has
context-sensitive features and that a theory of understanding that
highlights those features can incorporate our intuitions towards
understanding as well as consolidate the different accounts of
how to analyse understanding.
In developing a contextualist account of understanding, I will
argue that an account of the features commonly taken to be
central to understanding greatly benefits from a contextualist
framework. Central to my analysis will be the claim that a
person has to fulfil the function of a competent problem solver in
order to qualify for the ascription of understanding. In addition
to the theoretical elucidation of my contextualist approach
to understanding, a demanding hypothetical scenario will be
developed to function as a test case.
Keywords: understanding, contextualism, explanation, knowl-
edge, relevant alternatives
Introduction
Recent debates in epistemology have displayed an increasing interest
in the nature of understanding. While understanding, in the sense of
grasping phenomena and/or facts,1 is a central part of our making sense
of the world, modern epistemology has primarily been concerned with
the study of knowledge and the concepts it consists of. Some decades
ago, philosophers like Linda Zagzebski, Catherine Elgin and Jonathan
Kvanvig prominently voiced their growing discontent with this limitation
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of epistemological interest and propagated a turn towards understand-
ing.2 They intended not only to show that understanding is an epistemic
achievement worthy of philosophical consideration but that the study of
understanding may lead to a deeper understanding of epistemology it-
self.3
Since then, many authors have pondered the questions of whether
understanding is or is not a form of knowledge, what types of under-
standing there are, what features are central to understanding and why
understanding is a valuable epistemic goal.4 In the first section of this es-
say, this concept of understanding will be introduced by explaining how
the metaphor of emphgrasping can be explicated, by clarifying how un-
derstanding builds on factivity and by elucidating the gradual character
of understanding.
The second section will focus on the questions of why a theory of
understanding is best developed within a contextualist framework and
how such a framework should look like to capture our intuitions towards
understanding as well as the theoretical findings of the ongoing debate.
That our ordinary way of ascribing understanding favours such a con-
textualist treatment will be shown by referring to the context-sensitive
character of the concept of explanation and by elucidating the role con-
text plays in determining degrees of understanding. In the following
presentation of my contextualist theory of understanding, I will link the
contextualist framework that evolves around the concept of being a com-
petent problem solver to an objective construal of the knowledge of facts
and dependency relations, thus preserving the intuition that understand-
ing is a demanding cognitive achievement that incorporates more than
the mere knowledge of a fact. In the remainder of this section, I will
discuss rival accounts that incorporate contextualist elements as well as
the benefits a contextualist approach to understanding offers regarding
the ongoing debate on understanding.
After confirming this contextualist account of understanding in the
third section of this essay by discussing a demanding test scenario where
one and the same person correctly ascribes understanding to herself in
one context and refrains from ascribing the same understanding to her-
self in another context, I will look beyond the field of epistemology in
the conclusion of this essay. It will be glimpsed at how a contextualist
treatment of understanding may bridge the gap between the debate on
understanding in epistemology and the respective debate in the philoso-
phy of science.
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1 Central Features of Understanding
Understanding is a term that is used to describe various cognitive
achievements, among them the semantic and pragmatic understanding
on which every stretch of communication is based as well as the emo-
tional understanding natural human interaction relies on. However, the
term understanding as it is meant in the scope of this essay will refer to
neither of these concepts, but rather to the kind of understanding that
enables you to grasp (relations between) facts (e.g. why your car broke
down) and phenomena (e.g. quantum mechanics).
In this section, this schematic notion of understanding will be clar-
ified by looking at its three primary features. Before that, however, a
preliminary note regarding the different types of understanding is neces-
sary. Understanding is commonly taken to be divided into three types:
propositional understanding (S understands that p), objectual under-
standing (S understands P) and interrogative understanding (S under-
stands why/how/. . . p). Propositional understanding will not be of
interest in this essay, both because most authors argue that understand-
ing that p is just knowing that p and because it is far from being a
paradigmatic usage of “understanding”.5 In contrast, both objectual
understanding and interrogative understanding are to be considered as
paradigmatic and will thus be focused on. However, I will not differen-
tiate between these types of understanding when presenting my theory,
because it equally applies to both of them.6 Thus, the question of what,
if any, differences exist between these types of understanding is irrelevant
in the course of this essay.7
The first feature to focus on when elucidating the concept of under-
standing is the metaphorical notion of grasping. Grasping is used to
describe the cognitive operation we have to carry out in order to gain
understanding. To gain understanding of some phenomenon, we need
not only believe or have knowledge of the isolated facts belonging to
that phenomenon, but also be able to relate these facts to one another.
The act of joining the dots, of establishing relationships between facts
is what grasping refers to. There are diverse accounts of how to analyse
what grasping exactly consists of. For reasons of brevity, I will refer to
the analysis of Stephen Grimm.
According to Grimm, when we grasp something we exercise a “modal
sense or ability” which involves “not just to register how things are, but
also the ability to anticipate how certain elements of the system would
behave, were other elements different in one way or another”.8 In other
words, grasping requires one to exercise the ability to draw modal in-
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ferences which in turn requires the ability to think up counterfactual
conditionals. This process need not always be a conscious cognitive act.
In many everyday cases, where the phenomenon we seek to understand
does not pose much of a challenge to our cognitive abilities, the act of
grasping happens within fragments of seconds without us consciously
thinking about it. That grasping comes down to the described process
of drawing modal inferences becomes obvious when we are much more
challenged in trying to understand the respective phenomenon. In those
cases, counterfactual conditionals are thought up in order to gain un-
derstanding, for instance by asking questions of the form “What would
happen if. . . ?”.9 The second aspect central to the concept of understand-
ing is its factivity. Similar to knowledge, understanding is a demanding
cognitive achievement that builds on a factive basis. Whereas no agree-
ment has yet been reached on how to spell out this factive basis,10 it is
almost undisputed that in order to gain understanding of a phenomenon
the vast majority of the pieces of information we have regarding that
phenomenon need to be true. Since one cannot gain understanding of
a subject matter based on a body of false assumptions regarding that
subject matter, understanding needs to be conceived as a factive notion.
The last feature to consider is the gradual character of understand-
ing. Understanding exhibits graduality in two dimensions: breadth and
depth. Those dimensions can best be explained by picturing the object
of understanding as a layered structure, where each layer is made up by
facts of the same level of technicality or detailedness. Breadth of un-
derstanding corresponds to how many facts of one and the same layer
are known and how well these facts are related to one another with-
out incorporating facts from other layers. Depths of understanding then
corresponds to how much the understanding of the subject matter relies
on connecting facts from different layers, i.e. on connecting facts that
exhibit a different degree of technicality or complexity. Depending on
context, both breadth and depth of understanding might function as the
dominant factor or might be equally important in determining the over-
all degree of understanding. How the exact degree of understanding is
determined is still the subject of an ongoing debate. While authors have
tried to define graduality both as an enhancement of minimal under-
standing and as an approximation to maximal understanding, a direct
account of graduality seems to be most promising.11
We have now reached a sufficiently rough characterisation of what
the act of understanding is: the grasping of phenomena and/or facts
that admits of degrees and builds on a factive basis. In the following
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section, it will be shown why understanding should be embedded into a
contextualist framework.
2 Understanding Contextualised
2.1 Why Understanding Should Be Contextualised
In motivating his contextualist treatment of knowledge ascriptions, Keith
DeRose referred to ordinary talk as providing the “best grounds for ac-
cepting contextualism”.12 In a similar fashion, a contextualist approach
to understanding can be justified by looking at two integral elements of
our ordinary practice of ascribing understanding: its gradual character
and its close connection to the concept of explanation.
In a recent essay, Christoph Baumberger emphasized that much
closer attention should be paid to the fact that understanding admits
of degrees, noticing that the gradual character of understanding is es-
sential to the way we ordinarily ascribe understanding.13 Whenever we
evaluate whether to ascribe understanding to someone, the gradual na-
ture of understanding comes into play as either one of two underlying
questions. In the first case, we ask ourselves what degree of under-
standing we should ascribe to the person we are evaluating and are thus
directly concerned with the graduality of understanding. In the second
case, we ask ourselves whether the person qualifies for an ascription of
outright understanding, i.e. of an understanding that need not be grad-
uated. Each of these questions gives us strong reasons for believing that
understanding is a context-sensitive concept. Beginning with the first
case, every ascription of a degree of understanding happens relative to a
contextually determined standard. What counts as a high understanding
of the evolution in the course of a form nine biology lesson will not even
count as a low understanding of the same phenomenon in the course
of an appointment commission seeking to fill the vacant professorship
of biology.14 Between these two situations, neither the evaluated sub-
ject nor the object of understanding changes. The different evaluation
of the student’s understanding is solely caused by changing the person
that is ascribing understanding: the teacher in the first case and the
appointment commission in the other. What determines the standard
for the ascription of understanding is therefore the ascriber’s context.
This context is constituted by the conversational situation the ascriber
is in which in turn evolves around her interrogative interest (e.g. the
alternatives she considers or her reasons for doubting the correctness of
the subject’s answer).15
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Considering the second case, every ascription of outright understand-
ing boils down to the question of whether the understanding of the
evaluated person exceeds a certain threshold. Just like the standard
of understanding, this threshold is contextually determined. Holding
all other variables fixed, what the student has to understand about the
evolution in order to correctly be ascribed the outright understanding of
it by his teacher will be radically different from what the same student
would have to understand about the evolution in order to qualify for hav-
ing the respective outright understanding ascribed by the appointment
commission. Once again, it is the ascriber’s context that determines the
threshold for the ascription of outright understanding.
Besides its graduality, the close connection of understanding to the
concept of explanation also speaks in favour of a contextualist account of
understanding. Explanation is, in a certain sense, a contextualist notion.
While it is disputed whether contextual features should be taken into ac-
count when determining the correctness of an explanation, it is generally
agreed upon that they come into play when determining whether or not
an explanation succeeds in being explanatory.16 The way we ordinarily
talk about explanations confirms this verdict, since we keenly acknowl-
edge that whatever suffices as a good explanation of some phenomenon
for me does not necessarily need to be a good explanation of the same
phenomenon for my students. We intuitively admit that a number of
contextual factors determine whether an explanation is good: it has to
be intelligible; it has to appropriately relate to the subject’s background
knowledge of the respective phenomenon; when necessary, it has to in-
clude examples; and so forth. Those factors are contextual in the sense
that they relate to the addressee of the explanation, thus showing that
an explanation is essentially a complex description of some subject mat-
ter tailored to the intellectual background of its addressee.17 Assuming
that understanding is the goal of explanation,18 fundamentally different
explanations of some subject matter invoke a different understanding of
this subject matter. If what is understood about a subject matter then
depends on how it is explained and if the explanations used in order
to promote understanding significantly vary from context to context, in
quantity as well as in quality, then the understanding promoted by those
explanations also varies from context to context.
We can therefore conclude that both the gradual character of under-
standing as well as its close connection to the concept of explanation
suggest a contextualist treatment of understanding.
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2.2 Contextualist Account of Understanding
I propose the following contextualist account of understanding.
Contextualist Understanding
A speaker who utters the sentence “S understands why p“ in
context C is saying something true if and only if:
(1) S knows a number of facts regarding p and
(2) S knows some dependency relations regarding p and,
based on fulfilling (1) and (2),
(3) S is able to correctly solve all problems the speaker con-
siders relevant in C in a way the speaker deems suitable
in C.19
There are several things to note about this contextualist conception
of understanding. Firstly, every ascription of understanding happens
between three types of agents: an inquirer, an ascriber and a (putative)
problem solver. The inquirer is the agent that raises the problems that
the problem solver has to solve.20 She either already has understanding
of the respective subject matter and is thus just testing the problem
solver or has no understanding of the subject matter and is genuinely
looking for enlightenment. The ascriber is the agent who either as-
cribes understanding, refrains from ascribing understanding (in cases of
an unclear judgement) or denies the ascription of understanding to the
problem solver. The problem solver is the agent that either qualifies or
fails to qualify for the ascription of understanding.21 Note that these
agents represent different functional roles and do not carry any implica-
tions regarding the number of persons involved in the ascription process.
Furthermore, the given conception assumes that the speaker is both the
ascriber and the inquirer. More about the relationship between agents
and actual persons will be said in the third section of this essay.
Secondly, condition (1) of the given conception represents the back-
ground knowledge that is necessary for understanding. Exactly how
many facts S has to know to fulfil condition (1) will be a matter of
context. As a minimum requirement, at least those facts have to be
known that enable the knowledge of the dependency relation as stated
in condition (2).
Thirdly, condition (2) refers to the element of grasping.22 Since the
understanding of a phenomenon builds on grasping how the respective
facts regarding that phenomenon hang together, S need not only pos-
sess the knowledge of these individual facts, but also the knowledge
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of the dependency relations that exist between those facts.23 As with
condition (1), the extent of this knowledge will depend on the raised
problems. Generally put, the ascription of a more comprehensive un-
derstanding builds on the subject being able to solve more demanding
problems which in turn requires that the subject knows an increasing
number of dependency relations. As a minimum requirement, at least
one dependency relation will have to be known.
In conjunction with (1), condition (2) corresponds to the intuition
that understanding is a demanding cognitive achievement. As such, one
can only understand some subject matter if one possesses some knowl-
edge regarding that subject matter. It is thereby inessential whether
this knowledge is deemed relevant by the ascriber. An example helps
to clarify that point. Picture that an ascriber seeks the solution of a
pressing problem. Due to the urgency of the situation, she is only in-
terested in her problem being solved and does not care what, if any,
background knowledge the problem solver has of the respective prob-
lem. Assume that the problem solver provides a satisfying solution to
the posed problem; a solution, however, that he only acquired via tes-
timony and passed on without having grasped it. Think of him as a
reciter who merely reproduced a series of words. Now, by construing
(1) and (2) as objective conditions that do not include the question of
whether the ascriber deems the knowledge leading up to understanding
relevant, we can avoid that understanding is correctly ascribed in a case
like this. Since her problem was solved, the ascriber may momentarily
ascribe the respective understanding to the problem solver. However,
she would certainly revoke this ascription and acknowledge that she in-
correctly ascribed understanding to the problem solver as soon as she
learns that he only passed on a solution without having grasped it. After
all, he withheld the information that he acquired the respective solution
by testimony and thus pretended to have an understanding of the sub-
ject matter that enables him to think up such a solution while actually
lacking any relevant understanding.
Lastly, several parts of condition (3) require attention. Beginning
with the term problems, this word is meant as a collective term of ev-
erything that could be unclear in the process of understanding some
phenomenon, including mere conceptual ambiguities as well as complex
technical problems. Considering next the phrase in a suitable manner,
this qualification is included to guarantee that the solution of the posed
problems is tailored to the exact needs of the inquirer. It relates to the
cognitive skills of the problem solver and implies that she needs to put
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her background knowledge of the subject matter differently to use in
different contexts in order to promote the inquirer’s understanding. In
close connection to this, note that the posed solution needs to be correct.
The need for correctness is included to shield the conception against the
unwanted implication that understanding can be correctly ascribed to a
problem solver who, deliberately or by mistake, postulates incorrect so-
lutions or invokes false facts. Furthermore, it needs to be clarified what
problems are considered by the speaker. Generally, the inquirer raises
the set of problems that the problem solver has to solve. In the ma-
jority of cases, these exact problems will be considered by the ascriber
as being in need of a solution. However, it could be that, according to
the ascriber, the inquirer raises an inappropriate number of problems,
maybe because she is being cheeky or altogether unaware of the problem
solver’s cognitive abilities. Therefore, out of all the problems raised by
the inquirer, the problem solver only has to solve those problems that
are actually considered by the ascriber. Finally, note that the solution of
all relevant problems is demanded due to the proposal being a definition
of outright, i.e. non-graduated, understanding. Ascriptions of a specific
degree of understanding are compatible with some problems remaining
unsolved.
2.3 Rival Accounts
Considering that the way we ordinarily ascribe understanding substan-
tially involves contextual factors, it is surprising that the debate on un-
derstanding vastly neglected the issue of contextualism. So far, only two
accounts have been developed that incorporate contextualist elements.24
While they acknowledge that there is a contextual dimension to under-
standing, they fail to develop a comprehensive contextualist framework
based on those contextual elements. As a result, both accounts may not
only face internal inconsistencies, but also fall short of the advantages
an extensive contextualist treatment of understanding offers.
Developed by Christoph Baumberger and Christoph Kelp, both ac-
counts differ in how they incorporate contextualist elements. Central to
Kelp’s approach is that he postulates a context-independent maximal
understanding of a phenomenon that consists of the “fully comprehen-
sive and maximally well-connected knowledge” of that phenomenon.25
Outright understanding as well as the degrees of understanding are then
determined as a contextually defined distance to this maximal under-
standing, as the following definition shows:26
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Outright Understanding (Out-U)
“A understands P” is true in context c if and only if A approx-
imates fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected
knowledge of P closely enough to be such that A would
(be sufficiently likely to) successfully perform any task con-
cerning P determined by c, if, in addition, A were to have
the skills needed to do so and to exercise them in suitably
favourable conditions.
In contrast, Baumberger struggles with a context-independent con-
strual of maximal understanding that functions as a reference point for
the degrees of understanding and instead opts for a direct explication of
the degrees of understanding:27
An epistemic agent A understands a subject matter S by
means of a theory T only if A commits herself sufficiently to
T of S, and to the degree that
(1) A grasps T,
(2) T answers to the facts, and
(3) A’s commitment to T of S is justified.
This definition then functions as the basis for a contextual determi-
nation of outright understanding:28
It depends on the context how well the four conditions need
to be met for an outright attribution of understanding to
come out true. [. . . ] Individually necessary and collec-
tively sufficient conditions for outright understanding in a
given context can be arrived at by defining a context-specific
threshold for each of the four conditions [. . . ].
Although it would be worthwhile to discuss the details of both ac-
counts, such as the problems a context-independent construal of max-
imal understanding is facing, only a shared deficit can be looked at in
the scope of this essay. Kelp and Baumberger at no point clarify what
context they are exactly talking about when binding the ascription of
understanding to a specific context. It is left to their readers to figure out
whether they take the ascriber’s, the inquirer’s or the problem solver’s
context as guiding the ascription of understanding. One would guess
that what they refer to is the ascriber’s context, but by not making this
reference explicit their accounts lack clarity, provoke misconceptions and
may face inconsistencies.
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An example will suffice to show that the omission of perspectival con-
siderations, especially the omission of an ascriber’s perspective, may im-
pair their account’s consistency. In presenting the mentioned school case,
Kelp writes that “we may be happy to attribute outright understand-
ing [. . . ] to an eight-year-old in a context of a primary school teacher’s
discussion of pupil performance [. . . ]” (my emphasis).29 Although I do
not think that Kelp intended the scenario to be read this way, the inat-
tentive reader could easily conclude that, when ascribing understanding,
the performance of an alleged problem solver is judged from an external
perspective. After all, ‘we’ refers to no one in the presented scenario.
However, that is not how we ordinarily ascribe understanding. We do
not take over the role of an external ascriber who is able to regard ev-
ery factor about a subject’s performance when judging whether or not
this subject qualifies for an ascription of understanding. Instead, when-
ever we ascribe understanding, we are an internal part of the ascription
process and are thus subject to our own personal perspective. We can
thus only consider those factors about the respective subject that we
can assess out of our context of ascription.30 These implications of the
ascriber’s perspective are an integral element of any context-sensitive
concept and are the main reason why ascribers can come to mutually
inconsistent and yet individually correct evaluations of, say, a subject’s
understanding.
Any theory that involves contextualist elements therefore seems to
require the inclusion of perspectival considerations. ‘Context’ cannot
merely be included in a given definition to serve as a universal rem-
edy without specifying the underlying conditions of the referred context.
Since Kelp and Baumberger are opting for an account of understanding
that incorporates context-sensitivity, they need to further specify what
context they are exactly referring to in order to avoid ambiguities and
inconsistencies. Those problems can be avoided by embracing a contex-
tualist treatment of understanding and by specifying all the underlying
conditions of such a contextualist framework, primarily by including the
necessary perspectival considerations. It is for that reason that an exten-
sive contextualist treatment of understanding fares better than its rival
accounts that only incorporate contextualist elements.
2.4 Implications for the Current Debate on Understanding
A contextualist approach to understanding benefits the current debate
on understanding in a number of ways. One major advantage such an ac-
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count has is that it offers a straightforward way of dealing with the grad-
uality of understanding. In the school case, we have already seen that
contextual factors come into play when determining the degree of under-
standing a subject has of a specific phenomenon. The given account can
then function as the basis for a direct explication of the degrees of un-
derstanding by constituting conditions (1) to (3) as a dynamic function
by means of which the specific degree of understanding is determined.
The rough idea would be that the better the subject fulfils conditions
(1) to (3), as weighed by the ascriber, the better her understanding of
the respective phenomenon. Exactly to what extent (1) to (3) need to
be fulfilled to constitute what specific degree of understanding is con-
textually determined and cannot be generalised. In some contexts, the
ascriber might value the problem solver’s background knowledge higher
than her ability to solve a wide range of problems, whereas in other con-
texts the problem solver’s background knowledge might be not as or just
as important as her ability to solve specific problems.31
The second benefit a contextualist account of understanding offers is
that it provides a way of settling a number of yet unresolved disputes
regarding understanding. Baumberger recently emphasized that the cur-
rent debate on understanding is at risk of running idle unless accounts
are developed that take the graduality of understanding seriously and,
in doing this, make the majority of questions regarding the features of
understanding less of a pressing matter.32 Considering that the pre-
sented account acknowledges that what understanding exactly consists
of may not only vary relative to the specific degree of understanding but
also relative to the context of ascription, these questions seem even less
pressing.
We can now conclude that a contextualist treatment of understand-
ing offers significant theoretical advantages over rival accounts, benefits
the ongoing debate on understanding and mirrors our ordinary way of
ascribing understanding. In the following section, this conclusion will be
backed up by the help of a test case. Additionally, an ascription schema
of understanding will be developed.
3 Test Scenario: Ascriptions of Understanding in 1st Person
Cases
The main class of cases where the contextual nature of understanding
can be observed are the so-called third-person cases: cases in which
two ascribers judge contrastingly but individually correct whether or
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not to ascribe understanding to a subject, where this subject itself is
not actively participating in the conversation.33 Just like the above
mentioned school example, the vast majority of our everyday ascriptions
of understanding fall into this class of cases. It should be clear by now
that these cases heavily speak in favour of a contextualist treatment of
understanding, not just because of the arguments brought forward in
this essay, but also because it is a common scenario that two ascribers
disagree about whether or not to ascribe understanding to a subject
merely by having different expectations towards this subject. Thus, a
thorough analysis of a third-person case, while undoubtedly supporting
my proposed theory, would barely offer any additional insights.
It is for this reason that a much more unusual case will be analysed
in this section: the ascription of understanding out of a first-person’s
perspective. To do this, a twofold scenario will be developed, where one
and the same person first ascribes the understanding of a subject matter
to himself and later denies the ascription of the same understanding to
himself. If the contextualist character of understanding can be conclu-
sively argued for on the basis of such a demanding scenario, there is good
reason for believing that understanding should generally be conceived as
a contextualist notion. To additionally increase the persuasiveness of the
following scenario, I refrained from using the term ‘explanation’ as well
as any gradual ascriptions of understanding. If the scenario remains to
present a convincing case for the contextualist character of understand-
ing, even with being deprived of these naturally contextualist concepts,
a more decisive conclusion can be arrived at. The following tide case
will be the basis of this section’s analysis:
(LOW) Last summer, I, Martin, walked down a beach by the
North Sea with my daughter Paula. We were on a family
holiday in Northern Germany. Noticing that it’s low tide,
my daughter uttered the following sentences: “We learned at
school that it’s called the tides when the sea comes and goes.
But I don’t understand why it happens. Do you?” After
having answered her question with “Yes, I do, I can tell you
all about the tides”, I began to comprehensively describe
how the moon causes the tides. I told her how the moon’s
gravity pulls the water on earth into a tidal bulge on the side
facing the moon and into another bulge on the opposite side
of the earth. Continuing my elaboration, I described how the
tidal bulges travel over the earth’s surface due to the earth’s
rotation and stated that those bulges are greatest on coasts
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that open up to an ocean, which is why it’s easier to observe
the tides at the North Sea than at the Baltic Sea. Satisfied
with my answer, my daughter concludingly said: “Thanks
daddy, now I understand the tides.”
(HIGH) Later that day, I met Hank, a friend of mine who
happens to be a physicist, at a local pub. Still thinking of the
great afternoon I had spent with my daughter, I proudly told
Hank how I had helped my daughter to understand the tides.
Although valuing my efforts, Hank critically remarked that I
didn’t mention a number of aspects that are central features
of the tides. Firstly, I hadn’t told my daughter that the sun
influences the tides, although both neap and spring tides are
only possible because of the sun. He also criticised that I had
analysed the varying perceptibility of the tides only in terms
of whether or not the specific coast opens up to an ocean. A
much easier and, in fact, more accurate way to describe this
phenomenon would have been to refer to the varying masses
of water in the different seas, a description that could have
easily been backed up by reminding my daughter that much
higher waves can be made in a bath tub than in a bowl of
soup. Sparked with scientific fascination, he lastly remarked
that the tidal forces even influence the earth’s land masses
and are strong enough to marginally slow down the earth’s
rotation. Since I hadn’t known any of those aspects of the
tides prior to Hank’s little talk, I gloomily said: “I don’t
understand the tides after all.”
This twofold scenario presents two individually correct but mutually
contradictory understanding claims. By affirming Paula’s question in
LOW, Martin implicitly expresses the following positive understanding
claim:
(1A) I understand the tides.
Whereas the “I do” would only amount to the interrogative under-
standing of what causes the tides, the unrestricted “I can tell you all
about the tides” amounts to the objectual understanding of the tides.
Such an unrestricted claim is not unusual when uttered by parents speak-
ing to their (young) children. Adults are commonly not inclined to grad-
uate their claim to understand a phenomenon as long as they consider
themselves able to thoroughly explain that phenomenon. It is thereby
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not essential how elaborate their understanding actually is as long as the
respective understanding surpasses a specific threshold. In general, this
threshold is contextually determined by presupposing what problems will
most likely be raised by the inquirer and what explanations are neces-
sary to solve these problems in a suitable manner. In LOW, Martin thus
presupposes what questions his daughter might raise regarding the tides
and whether he is able to answer all of these questions in a way that
satisfies his daughter’s curiosity. If he cannot think of a single question
that he would not be able to answer thoroughly, there is no reason for
him to mitigate his outright claim to understand the tides.
As long as there is a sufficiently high difference between the under-
standing the inquirer and the problem solver possess of a specific sub-
ject matter, outright understanding is commonly ascribed in that way.
Whether you think of a primary school child asking her mother why the
moon does not always look the same or of a maths teacher seeking the
help of his fellow ethics teacher in trying to understand Kant’s categori-
cal imperative: if the problem solver can rationally consider herself able
to solve all of the problems possibly raised by the inquirer, there is no
reason for her not to claim the outright understanding of the respec-
tive subject matter in that context. However, the situation significantly
changes when the problem solver and the inquirer are much closer to
each other in their understanding of the subject matter. Picture that
two physics students of the same semester are discussing specific details
of the theory of relativity and that one of them is asking the other if she
understood them and can thus explain them to her. In such a case, an
outright answer would seem vastly overconfident, rendering an answer
along the lines of “I understood parts of those details” or “I can try my
best explaining them to you” much more likely and natural. As soon
as the problem solver is speaking to an inquirer who possesses a higher,
a similar or perhaps at least an elemental understanding of the respec-
tive subject matter, she cannot rule out that a much more demanding
problem will be raised whose solution might exceed both her background
knowledge of the subject matter and her problem-solving abilities, thus
rendering an outright claim to understanding presumptuous und unnat-
ural.
It is therefore not surprising that Martin utters the following negative
understanding claim in HIGH:
(1B) I don’t understand the tides.
Due to a significant disparity between Martin’s mundane and Hank’s
scientifically elaborate understanding of the tides, (1B) seems to be a
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correct and relatively natural assertion in that context. Two aspects of
the situation lead up to Martin’s conclusion. Firstly, the features of the
tides that are brought forward by Hank are structurally quite similar to
the features of the tides that Martin already understood. What Martin
learns from Hank is no professional knowledge only a physicist could pos-
sess, but rather something he, being an interested amateur, could have
known. Martin thus realises that his assumed understanding of the tides
is nothing more than elemental. Secondly, Hank lectures Martin with-
out any preparation and without needing to pause for thought, thereby
indicating that what he is explaining, although being of value to Martin,
does not even come close to a comprehensive physical analysis of the
tides. Taken together with the first observation, this gives Martin ev-
ery reason to assume that he would not be able to answer any question
raised by Hank in a suitable manner, which translates to the conclu-
sion that Martin’s understanding of the tides falls short of the threshold
underlying the demanding context of Martin’s and Hank’s conversation.
The presented scenario only speaks in favour of the contextualist
character of understanding if, in hindsight, Martin considers both of his
claims, (1A) and (1B), correct. Considering (1A), while his conversation
with Hank certainly forced Martin to reassess his understanding of the
tides, it did not deprive him of his ability to function as a competent
problem solver for his daughter. After all, Martin only learned that his
understanding of the tides is limited and not that it consists of false as-
sumptions. He correctly estimated his daughter’s understanding of the
tides and was able to satisfactorily explain the tides to her. Further-
more, as long as his daughter’s expertise in physics does not increase
significantly and as long as she asks him about phenomena that he un-
derstands at least as good as he understood the tides, Martin does not
need to refrain from uttering outright understanding claims in the fu-
ture. However, he would need to utter a gradual understanding claim
as soon as he presupposes that his daughter will raise a problem that
he cannot solve appropriately. Considering (1B), it is similarly obvious
that Martin was correct in uttering his negative understanding claim
in an outright fashion. In such a demanding context, even claiming to
understand something about the tides would seem presumptuous, since
his layman’s understanding of the tides is far from being suited for a
discussion with a professional physicist. Even worse, he might provoke
Hank to test his understanding of the tides; a test he would certainly
fail, since he would not be able to satisfactorily solve any problem raised
by Hank.
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The presented case therefore speaks in favour of the contextualist
nature of understanding by presenting a pair of individually correct and
yet mutually inconsistent understanding claims regarding the same sub-
ject matter and uttered by the same person. Those claims contrast with
each other due to the subject being able to fulfil his role as a competent
problem solver in one of the scenarios while failing to fulfil this role in
the other. Specific presuppositions are central to determining whether
this role is fulfilled by the putative problem solver. Those presupposi-
tions regard the relevant background knowledge of the putative problem
solver, her ability to put this knowledge to use as well as the problems
that will most likely be raised by the inquirer. The following schema
summarises the process of ascribing understanding:
Ascription Schema of Understanding
(I) The ascriber presupposes what problems regarding the
phenomenon in question will most likely be raised by
the inquirer.
(II) The ascriber estimates whether the inquirer will pre-
sumably raise any (appropriate) problems that the pu-
tative problem solver cannot solve in such a way that
the inquirer will be satisfied. To do that, the ascriber
evaluates both the putative problem solver’s knowledge
of the respective phenomenon as well as her ability to
put this knowledge to use.
(III) When (II) yields a negative result (i.e. when there are
no problems raised by the inquirer that the putative
problem solver cannot satisfactorily solve), the under-
standing of the specific phenomenon is ascribed to the
putative problem solver by the ascriber; when it yields
a positive result, the respective understanding is not as-
cribed. The putative problem solver thus either qualifies
or fails to qualify as a competent problem solver.
This schema can be applied to all possible combinations of ascriber,
inquirer and problem solver, up to the extreme case where all roles are
taken over by one and the same person who is on her own pondering
about a problem. Furthermore, the schema can incorporate cases of
“blindly” ascribing understanding where the inquirer merely supposes
that there might be a problem that the putative problem solver cannot
solve without having a clear conception of what this problem might
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be. It can also incorporate gradual ascriptions of understanding as well
as retrospective ascriptions of understanding. In the latter case the
ascriber, instead of presupposing the possibly raised problems and the
utilised solutions, simply evaluates to what degree the problem solver
fulfilled the invoked criteria.
4 Conclusion
The arguments and case scenarios brought forward in this essay chal-
lenge the way the concept of understanding has been discussed so far
by strongly favouring a contextualist treatment of understanding. It has
been shown that a contextualist approach can be motivated by acknowl-
edging that two aspects of our ordinary way of ascribing understanding
are naturally context-sensitive: the concept of explanation and the grad-
ual character of understanding. The proposed account then incorporates
the contextualist nature of understanding by proposing that, in order to
be correctly ascribed understanding, a subject has to satisfactorily solve
all problems an ascriber considers. To prevent that understanding is
too easily achieved, two objective conditions have been included into the
account, stating that the respective subject has to know a number of
facts and dependency relations regarding the subject matter she claims
to understand. The discussion of the proposed account has yielded the
result that a contextualist treatment of understanding not only fares
better than its rival accounts in incorporating the way understanding
is ordinarily ascribed, but also consolidates a number of questions still
discussed in the epistemological debate on understanding.
Assuming that there is some truth in what I have proposed in this
essay, I want to hint at another advantage a contextualist treatment of
understanding may offer: it may bridge the gap between the debates on
understanding in epistemology and in philosophy of science.34 In their
Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding, de Regt and Dieks
acknowledge that whether or not scientific practices lead to a better
understanding of some phenomenon depends on the context in which
those scientific practices are carried out.35 This context is, for instance,
constituted by the scientist’s background knowledge of the respective
phenomenon, by her ability to put this knowledge to use and by specific
virtues of the theories and models used in trying to understand that phe-
nomenon. The central difference between de Regt’s and Dieks’s account
and the approach I have proposed thus seems to be that they incorpo-
rate models and theories in a much more explicit way. It therefore seems
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that the debates could be unified by conceiving our ordinary process of
understanding as involving elements of theory formation. After all, when
we try to understand some subject matter, we connect facts in a way
that enables us to give a coherent explanation of that subject matter,
even though we rarely begin with formulating a theory.
Undoubtedly, a number of questions need to be answered for such a
unifying proposal to be fruitful, such as whether it is correct to assume
that scientific understanding is a higher-order ordinary understanding
without being substantially different in kind. Similarly, much more work
needs to be done to conclusively argue for the contextual framework it-
self: clarifying the relation between objectual and interrogative under-
standing; learning more about how the agents involved in the ascription
process relate to one another; and so forth. However, one should not
be repelled by these open questions from acknowledging the merits a
contextualist approach to understanding offers.
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Notes
1 Unless otherwise stated, “understanding” is meant in this sense. This notion
presupposes that the agents in question understand the words they are using
on a semantic level. In denoting the general object of understanding, I refrain
from using the common phrase “body of information”, since information can
also function as the vehicle of understanding. In contrast, “phenomena and/or
facts” seem to be a suitable description of the various objects of understanding
(presupposing that “phenomena” is conceived in a broad sense).
2 The very first essays that included aspects still prevalent in the ongoing debate
were [24], [15], [16], [5] and [6]. However, these publications did not attract
as much attention as they deserve, which is why [11], [23] and [28] should be
considered the starting point of the current debate.
3 See [28, p. 249].
4 A comprehensive overview of the recent debate on understanding is given in [3].
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5 Among others, [1], [4], [12] and [17] argue that propositional understanding re-
duces to propositional knowledge, with [17] additionally stating that propositional
understanding may also describe cases of hedging and may thus be epistemically
irrelevant. The opposite view can be found in [23].
6 For reasons of simplicity, this section’s analysis will be based on objectual under-
standing.
7 As to be found in [3], several authors have considered a reductionist account
of understanding, with most of them concluding that such an account is not
possible. However, they only considered a reduction of objectual understanding
to explanatory understanding, a sub-type of interrogative understanding that
focuses exclusively on explanatory dependency relations. By embedding other
types of dependency relations, a reductionist account should be possible.
8 See [19, p. 89]. Grimm further builds on this first analysis in [20] and [21].
9 Giving explanations is another scenario which indicates that grasping can be
analysed in the presented way. Questions of the kind “What would happen if. . . ?”
are commonly used to assess how much of a given explanation has already been
understood.
10 Some authors challenge the strict factivity of understanding by arguing that
models and representations are often used to invoke understanding, while at the
same time abstracting how things are in reality. An early representative of this
view is [25]; its most prominent advocate is Catherine Elgin, see [11], [12] and
[13]. Two accounts that defend the strict factivity of understanding are [18] and
[22].
11 Degrees of understanding are analysed as an approximation of maximal under-
standing in [22], as an enhancement of minimal understanding in [21] and as a
direct explication in [2].
12 See [10, p. 47].
13 See [2].
14 I owe this example to [22].
15 More about the ascriber’s context can be found in the debate on epistemic contex-
tualism. Note that contextualism implies that two ascriptions can seem mutually
inconsistent and yet be individually correct, due to the fact that each ascription
is relativised to a specific context constituted by the respective ascriber’s inter-
rogative interest. While, in the given example, the teacher and the appointment
commission come to contrasting evaluations of the student’s understanding, each
of those evaluations is correct relative to the context it was made out of.
16 See [26, chpt. 4.4].
17 In labelling explanation as a complex description I follow van Camp, see [27, p.
106].
18 Note that in order to achieve understanding, the respective explanation needs to
be good and correct. See [27].
19 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that the given conception presupposes that
there is some sort of direct contact between the ascriber and the problem solver
and thus cannot incorporate ascriptions based on testimony. Unfortunately, such
cases are neither addressed in the debate on contextualism nor is this essay the
place to do so. However, I’m confident that a contextualist account of under-
standing can incorporate cases like these.
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20 While the definition may not reveal it, my comments on condition (3) will show
how the inquirer comes into play.
21 I owe this term to Zagzebski, whereas the concept it expresses is based on Ernst’s
notion of a competent informant. Regarding Zagzebski, see [28, p. 245]; regarding
Ernst, see [14] as well as Craig’s comments in [7, p. 11].
22 This condition can also be regarded as belonging to the subject’s background
knowledge.
23 The relation between grasping and the knowledge of dependency relations was
introduced by Grimm [20, p. 341]. Note that dependency relations should be
conceived in the broadest possible way of including all relations that can exist
between facts (logical, causal, mereological, etc.). See, for instance, [20] and [27].
24 Outside epistemology, DeRegt and Dieks developed a contextualist account of
understanding.
25 See [22, p. 252].
26 See [22, pp. 252-254].
27 See [2, p. 10].
28 See [2, pp. 10-11].
29 See [22, p. 254].
30 Note that the ascriber’s context is not sufficiently defined by the situational
context of the scenario (e.g. the classroom in the school case), because we can
easily imagine cases where two ascribers share one situational context and yet
differ in their ascriptions.
31 As a result, a subject’s gradual understanding of a phenomenon, her outright
understanding of a phenomenon as well as the possible maximal understanding
of a phenomenon can all only be determined by reference to the context of an
ascriber.
32 See [2, pp. 3-4].
33 See [10, chpt. 2.7]. When considering the underlying mechanics of ascribing
understanding, the essential characteristic of these cases is that the ascriber is
not herself the problem solver, i.e. that it is no self-ascription of understanding.
Since ascriptions of understanding out of a second-person’s perspective share this
characteristic, they do not need to be analysed separately, although the subject
understanding is ascribed to takes part in the conversation.
34 Although the concept of understanding has fuelled a large number of publications
in both disciplines, no serious attempts were made in bringing these debates
together. See [3, p. 2].
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